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Do Children Who Experience Regret Make Better Decisions?
A Developmental Study of the Behavioral Consequences of Regret
Eimear O’Connor, Teresa McCormack, and Aidan Feeney
Queen’s University Belfast
Although regret is assumed to facilitate good decision making, there is little research directly addressing this
assumption. Four experiments (N = 326) examined the relation between children’s ability to experience regret
and the quality of their subsequent decision making. In Experiment 1 regret and adaptive decision making
showed the same developmental proﬁle, with both ﬁrst appearing at about 7 years. In Experiments 2a and 2b,
children aged 6–7 who experienced regret decided adaptively more often than children who did not experi-
ence regret, and this held even when controlling for age and verbal ability. Experiment 3 ruled out a mem-
ory-based interpretation of these ﬁndings. These ﬁndings suggest that the experience of regret facilitates
children’s ability to learn rapidly from bad outcomes.
Sometimes our choices do not lead to the best
possible outcome and to behave adaptively we
need to learn to choose differently. For example,
when our alarm clock goes off in the morning, we
may choose to press the snooze button and thus
miss our train to work. To avoid this undesirable
outcome, we need to behave differently the next
time the alarm goes off. This is an example of what
we will term adaptive choice switching: behavior
that involves making a different decision when
faced with the same or a similar choice again. An
intuitively plausible account of how learning occurs
in this sort of situation is that the initial choice and
its ensuing relatively bad outcome, by virtue of a
comparison with an alternative counterfactual pos-
sibility, lead to an experience of regret, and this
leads to adaptive choice switching (see Zeelenberg
& Pieters, 2007). The claim that regret may play a
key role in underpinning decision making is partic-
ularly interesting in a developmental context,
because, as we will discuss, regret is generally con-
sidered a complex emotion that emerges relatively
late in development. These considerations suggest a
simple developmental hypothesis: that the emer-
gence of regret facilitates better decision making in
children. Despite a considerable amount of interest
in the processes that may underpin improvements
in children’s decision making, this hypothesis has
not yet been tested experimentally. This study
reports a series of experiments designed to address
this issue.
Regret and Decision Making
Regret is the negative emotion that occurs when
the outcome of a decision is compared unfavorably
with an alternative, counterfactual, outcome that
could have obtained had a different decision been
made (Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Kahneman &
Miller, 1986). There has been an explosion of
research on regret in neuroeconomics, behavioral
decision making, and social psychology. Within this
literature, a distinction is made between the effects
on decision making of experienced versus antici-
pated regret (Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007), with the
former referring to the subsequent effects on deci-
sion making of experiencing regret, having already
chosen poorly, and the latter referring to the effects
on one’s current decision making of attempting to
anticipate and thus minimize future regret. The lit-
erature has predominantly been concerned with the
anticipation of regret, with economic models of
decision making postulating that people weigh up
the potential regret that may result from different
choices (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982). Stud-
ies have shown that people are regret averse: When
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choosing they avoid outcomes that they anticipate
they will regret (e.g., Josephs, Larrick, Steele, &
Nisbett, 1992; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, &
de Vries, 1996). There have also been some investi-
gations of the role of experienced regret on adap-
tive choice, albeit fewer than of anticipated regret.
For example, it is known that experienced regrets
have consequences for behavior in consumer choice
and interpersonal economic contexts such as negoti-
ation and bidding (Ku, 2008; Zeelenberg & Beattie,
1997; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999).
As we have said, the well-known formal models
of the role of regret have focused on anticipated
regret (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982);
accounts of experienced regret are less detailed.
Zeelenberg and Pieters (2007) provide the most
extensive discussion of this issue, arguing that the
primary and distinctive function of experienced
regret is to enable people to switch choices when
faced with the same decision again. The means by
which this occurs is not described in detail, but
they claim that experienced regret not only helps us
to remember our mistakes and missed opportuni-
ties and motivates us to engage in reparative action;
by means of mental undoing it also prepares us to
behave more appropriately when we are confronted
with similar choices in the future (p. 13).
Thus, the process of experiencing regret leads to
the evaluation and coding of a choice as a poor one
and makes salient alternative courses of action. An
alternative analysis is provided by Baumeister,
Vohs, DeWall, and Zhang (2007), who recognize a
role for experienced emotions in decision making,
but suggest that the primary means by which such
emotions affect choices is by leading the individual
to anticipate negative emotions in the future and
thus avoid repeating choices that would lead to
such emotions. Although this analysis does not
imply that we should drop the distinction between
experienced and anticipated regret, it suggests that
experienced regret affects subsequent decision mak-
ing primarily by leading to anticipated regret.
Thus, we can distinguish between at least two
ways in which experienced regret may affect deci-
sion making. It could be that the experience of
regret primes us to anticipate regret in subsequent
decisions, resulting in the rejection of a previously
selected option due to regret aversion. This is some-
what different from remembering that a particular
choice was a poor one (on the basis of the negative
emotional experience it yielded) and so, when faced
with the same choice again, deciding to avoid
the previously chosen option. Neuropsychological
studies support the ﬁrst of these alternatives, pro-
viding evidence that the same neuronal circuitry
responsible for the experience of regret also under-
lies the anticipation of regret when a choice is in
prospect (Coricelli et al., 2005). While the same
areas of the brain may underpin both experienced
and anticipated regret, it remains possible that
experiencing regret can result in adaptive behavior,
independent of the ability to anticipate regret. As
we shall see, a developmental study of the effect of
regret on decision making is important not just
because it may shed light on the degree to which
experienced regret is important for adaptive choice
switching, but because it may also establish
whether experienced regret, independent of antici-
pated regret, can play a fundamental role in
enhancing decision making.
The Development of Regret
Because regret is a counterfactual emotion (see
Kahneman & Miller, 1986) that involves comparing
what is to what might have been, the ability to
experience regret must develop after the ability to
think counterfactually. Empirical studies suggest
that counterfactual thought emerges as young as
3–4 years (Harris, German, & Mills, 1996; Riggs,
Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998), with others
arguing that genuine counterfactual thought may
develop some years later (see contributions to
Hoerl, McCormack, & Beck, 2011, for discussion).
The ﬁrst attempt to experimentally examine when
children directly experience regret was described by
Amsel and Smalley (2000). In their task, children
selected one of two face-down cards and won a
small prize if their selected card was of a higher
value than that of the experimenter. Once the
selected card was revealed, children rated their feel-
ings about their card choice. Children were then
shown the card they had not chosen (the counter-
factual alternative) and rated their feelings again.
Children were classiﬁed as experiencing regret if
they rated themselves as less happy about their
card choice upon seeing that the alternative card
would have yielded a win. Amsel and Smalley
found that 4- to 5-year-olds did not indicate experi-
encing regret under these circumstances.
Weisberg and Beck (2010) systematically
explored when the ability to experience regret
emerges. In their study, children chose between
two boxes. The nonchosen box in the regret condi-
tion always contained a better prize than the chosen
box. Children rated their feelings about their choice
before and after they were shown the alternative
prize in the nonchosen box. Children were classi-
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ﬁed as experiencing regret if they reported feeling
sadder following the revelation of the nonchosen
prize in the regret trial, and in some conditions they
did so as early as 5 years. O’Connor, McCormack,
and Feeney (2012) modiﬁed Weisberg and Beck’s
task by adding a baseline control condition in
which the prize in the nonchosen box was identical
to that in the chosen box. They argued that children
should be classiﬁed as experiencing regret if they
report feeling sadder only in the regret condition.
Using this criterion, they ﬁrst found evidence of
regret at 6 years (see also Burns, Riggs, & Beck,
2012). Thus, the small number of studies that have
been conducted in this area suggest that children
ﬁrst become capable of experiencing regret some-
time between 5 and 7 years (although for an excep-
tion that places this development much later, see
Rafetseder & Perner, 2012). Moreover, the ﬁndings
indicate that in samples from this age range, we
would expect to ﬁnd some children who are capa-
ble of experiencing regret, and some who do not
yet report (and so presumably do not experience)
this counterfactual emotion. The issue addressed in
the current experiments is whether such children
also differ in terms of their decision-making abili-
ties.
Although children develop the ability to experi-
ence regret between 5 and 7 years of age, they do
not appear to be able to anticipate regret until later
than this (see also Amsel, Bowden, Cottrell, & Sulli-
van, 2005). Guttentag and Ferrell (2008) report a
study in which participants were shown three
boxes, one containing no prize, one containing a
medium prize, and one containing a large prize.
Participants removed one box, and were then asked
to choose one of the remaining two boxes. All par-
ticipants won a medium prize and were asked
what they hoped was in the remaining unopened
box. Only by age 9 or 10 years did children (44%)
begin to indicate that they hoped there was no
prize in the unopened box. Younger children did
not anticipate the emotional effects of discovering
the big prize in the unopened box, and so they
rarely indicated that they hoped it contained no
prize. We replicated Guttentag and Ferrell’s (2008)
ﬁndings (McCormack & Feeney, 2014), and have
also separately shown that 6- to 7-year-olds who
are capable of experiencing regret cannot accurately
predict how they would feel if an as-yet-unknown
outcome turns out to be better than one that
resulted from their choice.
Although the ability to experience regret devel-
ops between the ages of 5 and 7 years, the ability
to anticipate regret seems to develop somewhat
later. Thus, a study of the relation between expe-
rienced regret and decision making in children
aged between 5 and 7 years has the potential not
only to investigate hypotheses about the centrality
of experienced regret to the development of adap-
tive decision making but also to test whether
the experience of regret can result in adaptive
decision making at an age at which it seems
likely that children are incapable of anticipating
regret.
The Current Experiments
The obvious developmental hypothesis that
emerges from a consideration of the literature on
experienced regret and decision making is that
when children begin to experience regret, their sub-
sequent decision making will improve. This
hypothesis rests on the assumption that experienc-
ing regret can affect decision making by a process
that does not involve anticipating regret. Given
Zeelenberg and Pieters’s (2007) claim about the
basic role of experienced regret in choice switching,
the prediction is that, following a nonoptimal deci-
sion, children who experience regret will be more
likely to make a better decision when faced with
the same choice again than those who do not. That
is, when the ability to experience regret emerges
developmentally, it should be accompanied by
improvements in what we have termed adaptive
choice switching. No research studies have yet
addressed this issue. Two studies, those of Burnett,
Bault, Coricelli, and Blakemore (2010) and Habib
et al. (2012), have examined reported regret along-
side decision making in older children, but they
were not designed to test this speciﬁc hypothesis.
Their studies examined more complex decision
making in a gambling task in which participants
decided between two gambles that varied in associ-
ated risk (Camille et al., 2004). Habib et al. found
developmental increases between 11 years and
adulthood in reported regret (although see Burnett
et al., 2010). Neither of these studies found a link
between regret and decision making. However, the
youngest participants were some years older than
the age at which regret is thought to emerge devel-
opmentally (O’Connor et al., 2012; Weisberg &
Beck, 2010) and these studies did not assess adap-
tive choice switching per se. Moreover, because
gambling paradigms involve many trials, they
make it almost inevitable that any regret effects
will be due to anticipated rather than experienced
regret. On tasks with multiple trials, it may be difﬁ-
cult to remember discrete experiences or to gauge
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the relation between a current gamble and previous
gambles.
In our experiments, we used a simple task
to examine whether there is a developmental
relation between regret and decision making, in
which children made a decision on the ﬁrst day,
discovered the outcome of this decision, and then
had to make the same decision again the following
day. In this sense, our task resembles an experimen-
tal version of the sort of everyday situation we
began our introduction with (the alarm clock exam-
ple), in which behaving adaptively involves making
a different choice when faced with the same deci-
sion again. The task was designed to examine both
whether children experienced regret when they dis-
covered the consequences of their initial choice and
whether they then adaptively switched choices
when faced with the same situation again. As in
O’Connor et al.’s (2012) study, children chose
between a pair of boxes in regret and baseline con-
ditions. By comparing children’s happiness ratings
before and after the outcomes of both choices were
known, we measured whether they experienced
regret. The next day, children were presented with
the same choices again. The payoff structure on the
2nd day means that to maximize their outcome,
children should switch choice in the regret condi-
tion only. We compared the rate of adaptive choice
switching among children who experienced regret
on Day 1 with those who did not, with our predic-
tion being that children who experience regret will
show higher rates of adaptive switching on Day 2.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants
Twenty-six 5-year-olds (13 females, M = 62.3
months, range = 60–66 months), twenty-eight 7-
year-olds (14 females, M = 85.5 months, range = 83–
89 months), and twenty-four 9-year-olds (15 females,
M = 110.1 months, range = 108–113 months) partici-
pated. In this and other experiments, children were
predominately from lower- to middle-class back-
grounds and of Caucasian origin.
Apparatus
The stimuli were four differently colored boxes
(25 9 14 9 21 cm), each with a distinctive picture
on its lid. Two colored boxes were used for the
regret condition and two for the baseline condition.
The baseline colored boxes each contained a smaller
silver box with one plastic token inside. The regret
colored boxes each contained two smaller silver
boxes. One of these silver boxes contained one
token and the other contained 10 tokens. The silver
boxes were designed so that they could be distin-
guished by touch alone, with one box having a
bumpy surface.
A 5-point affective response scale was used, with
each response point illustrated by one of ﬁve car-
toon faces varying in emotional expression from
very happy on the left to very sad on the right.
Children indicated their affective response to an
outcome by placing a three-pronged arrow pointing
at the appropriate face. This arrow had one prong
pointing upward, and a leftward- and a rightward-
pointing prong.
Procedure
All testing took place in a quiet room of the par-
ticipant’s school. On Day 1, participants were
invited to play a game in which they could win
tokens that would be exchanged for stickers once
the game was over. First, the scale was carefully
explained to participants in four practice trials
using two puppets. In each of the practice trials
participants saw one puppet receiving a gift and
were asked to indicate on the scale how they
thought the puppet would feel. Next they saw the
puppet receive an additional gift or have part of
their initial gift taken away. Participants were asked
to indicate, using the three-pronged arrow, whether
the puppet would feel happier (leftward prong),
sadder (rightward prong), or the same (upward-
pointing prong). Further details of this training pro-
cedure are provided in O’Connor et al. (2012). The
experiment did not commence until participants
had given the correct answers on all four practice
trials and participants who gave wrong answers
were corrected.
Once the practice trials had been completed, par-
ticipants were shown the baseline condition boxes
and were told that they contained tokens. The base-
line condition was always administered ﬁrst,
because previous research suggested that this maxi-
mizes the likelihood of experiencing regret in the
regret condition (O’Connor et al., 2012). Children
were given a single trial in each condition to avoid
the possibility that learned expectations about box
contents might affect emotional ratings. In the base-
line condition, children selected one colored box
and the smaller silver box was removed from the
chosen box and opened to reveal one token. Once
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children had expressed their affective response to
the outcome, the experimenter showed them the
prize that they could have won had they chosen
the other box, which was also one token. Using
the three-pronged arrow, participants indicated
whether they felt happier, sadder, or the same as
before. Next, the experimenter put the tokens back
inside the silver boxes, which were placed inside
the baseline boxes, and wrote the child’s name on
their chosen box, explaining that the same game
would be played again the following day with the
same prizes in the same boxes. The procedure for
the regret condition was identical except that
regardless of which colored box was chosen, the
experimenter always retrieved the silver box con-
taining one token and the counterfactual prize
retrieved from the nonchosen box was always 10
tokens. The experimenter counted the 10 tokens
from the nonchosen box in front of each participant.
The experimenter retrieved the appropriate silver
box from the regret boxes by identifying it by
touch, and children were unaware that there was
more than one silver box inside each colored box.
After children had completed both trials they
received two stickers.
Participants were called back the next day. First,
they were reminded that their name had been writ-
ten on the boxes they had previously chosen and
were told that the boxes contained the same prizes
as they had before. Participants were given the
same choices in the same order as on the previous
day. Prior to each choice, the experimenter gave
participants a token and showed them both colored
boxes, making it clear which box had been chosen
the day before. It was explained to participants that
they could exchange the token they had just
received in order to switch their choice, or they
could choose the box they had previously chosen
for free. The prize in the baseline condition was one
token regardless of box choice and one token in the
regret condition if participants stuck with their ori-
ginal choice, but 10 tokens if they switched.
We included a baseline condition to control for
the possibility that children might switch in the
regret condition for reasons unrelated to the adap-
tivity of switching. The observation that children
switched in both conditions would suggest that
switching was simply their preferred response,
most likely due to a general preference for novelty.
Note that this procedure included a cost of one
token for switching on Day 2. This was because
pilot work established that switching was indeed
many children’s preferred response, regardless of
condition. We hoped that the introduction of a
switching cost would lead participants to switch
only when it was proﬁtable to do so.
We ran a posttest to ensure that the youngest
participants were capable of the simple arithmetic
required to calculate the potential costs and beneﬁts
of switching. Participants saw a puppet who was
said to have one present and to be about to get
another. Another puppet was said to have one
present which she was due to lose but would then
get 10 more. Participants were asked which puppet
would then have most presents. All participants
gave the correct answer.
Results
In Table 1 we report the numbers of participants
who felt happier, sadder, and the same in each con-
dition once they saw the counterfactual prize. Few
of the youngest children reported feeling sadder in
the regret condition but that almost all of the older
children did. Participants who reported feeling
sadder in the regret condition only were coded as
having experienced regret.
In Table 2 we present switching data from Day
2 for each condition broken down by age group
and experienced regret. Many of the younger chil-
dren seemed to prefer to switch on Day 2 regard-
less of condition, while very few of the oldest
participants switched in the baseline condition.
Subsequent analysis controlled for nonadaptive
choice switching in the baseline condition. Partici-
pants who had switched in the regret condition
only were coded as adaptive switchers. All other
switching patterns were coded as nonadaptive.
Overall, there was a signiﬁcant association between
whether participants experienced regret on Day 1
and their decision making on Day 2, v2(1,
N = 78) = 20.05, p < .001, ΦC = .51. Fisher exact
probability tests revealed that the association did
not reach signiﬁcance for any of the individual age
groups, primarily because within each age group
the large majority of children either experienced or
did not experience regret (all ps > .2). Nonetheless,
subsequent analysis revealed that rates of adaptive
switching in some groups differed from those
expected by chance. Because there were three pos-
sible nonadaptive switching patterns and only one
adaptive pattern, the probability of switching adap-
tively due to chance was .25. Binomial tests
revealed that rates of adaptive switching among 7-
and 9-year-olds who experienced regret were
highly unlikely to be due to chance (in both cases,
p < .001). Among 5- and 7-year-old participants
who did not experience regret, rates of adaptive
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switching did not differ from those expected by
chance.
Discussion
Adaptive choice switching in this task appears
to emerge at the same time as the ability to experi-
ence regret. Five-year-old participants rarely experi-
enced regret upon learning that a counterfactual
prize was better than their actual prize, whereas
almost all 9-year-olds experienced regret. Similarly,
only one 5-year-old switched choices adaptively,
whereas nearly all 9-year-olds did. A substantial
proportion of 7-year-olds experienced regret; adap-
tive choice switching was also observed in the
majority of children this age group. Furthermore,
regret and adaptive choice switching appear to be
associated. Participants who experienced regret
were signiﬁcantly more likely to switch adaptively
than those who did not. These results provide
some initial support for the suggestion that the
development of regret allows children to learn
from previous decisions in order to adaptively
switch their choices.
In our paradigm, adaptive choice switching was
deﬁned not just as switching choices in Day 2 in
the regret condition, but, in addition, not switch-
ing on the baseline condition. In the regret condi-
tion, 5-year-olds’ performance was not very
dissimilar to that of the older groups: 65% of the
younger children choose to switch box on Day 2.
However, unlike in the older groups, a similar
percentage of 5-year-olds also switched choice in
the baseline condition. This ﬁnding indicates that
switching choices in the regret condition was not
always a result of good decision making, because
it suggests that some children may have had a
general preference for switching. Therefore, it is
important to examine whether children selectively
switch their choices only when it is advantageous
to do so, and how this relates to the experience of
regret.
Table 1
Numbers of Children Giving Each Emotional Response on Day 1 After the Counterfactual Prize Was Revealed in Each Condition in Experiment 1,
Broken Down by Age Group and Whether Participants Were Classiﬁed as Having Experienced Regret
Age group Experience regret
Baseline condition Regret condition
Happier Sadder No change Happier Sadder No change
5 Yes (N = 6) 2 0 4 0 6 0
No (N = 20) 1 3 16 6 0 14
7 Yes (N = 19) 4 0 15 0 19 0
No (N = 9) 2 0 7 0 0 9
9 Yes (N = 23) 6 0 17 0 23 0
No (N = 1) 0 0 1 0 0 1
Table 2
Numbers of Children Showing Each Pattern of Choices on Day 2 in Experiment 1 Broken Down by Age and Whether Participants Experienced
Regret in the Regret Condition
Age (years) Experience regret
Baseline condition Regret condition
Adaptive
switching
Switch No switch Switch No switch Yes No
5 Yes (N = 6) 5 1 5 1 0 6
No (N = 20) 14 6 12 8 1 19
7 Yes (N = 19) 4 15 17 2 14 5
No (N = 9) 4 5 7 2 4 5
9 Yes (N = 23) 4 19 22 1 19 4
No (N = 1) 0 1 0 1 0 1
Note. The two leftmost data columns show the numbers of children who switched choices in the baseline condition. The middle data
columns show the equivalent numbers in the regret condition. The rightmost data columns show the numbers of children who switched
adaptively (i.e., switched in the regret but not baseline condition).
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The results of this experiment on its own do not
provide convincing evidence that children who
experience regret are better decision makers.
Because of the wide age range employed, there
were large subgroups of children, deﬁned by age,
who either did or did not experience regret. Thus,
whether or not a participant was capable of experi-
encing regret was confounded with age. As many
abilities develop with age, it is difﬁcult to make
causal claims about the link between the ability to
experience regret and the tendency to switch adap-
tively based on a sample with such an age range.
Our aims in the next experiments were to replicate
the association between experienced regret and
choice switching in 6- and 7-year-old children, con-
trolling for age. We chose this age group because
children in the 7-year-old sample in Experiment 1
varied in the ability to experience regret.
Experiment 2a
Method
Participants
Seventy-one 6- to 7-year-olds (36 females, M =
80.6 months, range = 72–92 months) participated.
Apparatus and Procedure
These were identical to those used in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
One child reported feeling sadder after the
counterfactual prize was revealed in both condi-
tions. Due to the difﬁculty in interpreting this
pattern of performance, the data from this child
were excluded from the analyses. The numbers of
participants who felt happier, sadder, and the same
after seeing the counterfactual prize in each condi-
tion are reported in Table 3. Rates of choice switch-
ing in each condition on Day 2, broken down by
whether participants experienced regret, are pre-
sented in Table 4. Slightly more participants experi-
enced regret than participants did not experience
the emotion. In the regret condition, switching
appears to be strongly associated with the experi-
ence of regret. The majority of participants did not
switch in the baseline condition, although there was
a sizable minority that did switch, regardless of
whether they had experienced regret. Once again,
we controlled for nonadaptive choice switching in
the baseline condition. A chi-square test revealed a
signiﬁcant association between the experience of
regret on Day 1 and adaptive choice switching on
Day 2, v2(1, N = 70) = 9.61, p < .005 ΦC = .37. To
ensure that the association between regret and
adaptive choice switching is not confounded with
age, we carried out a binary logistic regression with
adaptive choice switching on Day 2 as the outcome
variable, using age in months and whether partici-
pants experienced regret on Day 1 as the predictor
variables. The results of this analysis are presented
in Table 5. While regret on Day 1 was a signiﬁcant
predictor of adaptive choice switching on Day 2,
age in months was not. Thus, within this sample an
increase in age did not lead to more adaptive
choice switching on Day 2 and, more important,
controlling for age, the association between regret
and adaptive choice switching was statistically
signiﬁcant.
In order to control for a tendency to switch on
Day 2, we deﬁned adaptive decision making with
Table 3
Numbers of Children Giving Each Emotional Response on Day 1 After the Counterfactual Prize Was Revealed in Each Condition in Experiments
2–3, Broken Down by Whether Participants Were Classiﬁed as Having Experienced Regret
Experience regret
Baseline condition Regret condition
Happier Sadder No change Happier Sadder No change
Experiment 2a
Yes (N = 38) 9 0 29 0 38 0
No (N = 32) 7 1 24 7 0 25
Experiment 2b
Yes (N = 61) 20 0 41 0 61 0
No (N = 52) 14 3 35 6 0 46
Experiment 3
Yes (N = 36) 12 0 24 0 36 0
No (N = 24) 7 0 17 5 0 19
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reference to both the regret and baseline conditions.
It is important, although, to show that the associa-
tion with the ability to experience regret holds in
the regret condition, independently of performance
in the baseline condition. Examination of Table 4
suggests that these conditions differ in the nature of
their association with whether regret is experienced.
That is, participants who experienced regret on Day
1 were more likely to switch in the regret condition
than were participants who did not experience
regret, v2(1, N = 70) = 17.44, p < .001, ΦC = .50,
whereas participants who did not experience regret
were somewhat more likely to switch in the baseline
condition than did participants who experienced
regret, v2(1, N = 70) = 4.23, p < .05, ΦC = .25. These
results indicate that the experience of regret is
associated with adaptive switching in the regret
condition independent of performance in the base-
line condition.
These results support our hypothesis that for
adaptive choice switching to be reliably observed in
our task, children must be capable of experiencing
regret, and in this experiment age was not related to
whether participants were capable of regret follow-
ing a bad choice outcome. In addition, because it
seems unlikely that children of the age range used
in this study are able to anticipate regret (Amsel
et al., 2005; Guttentag & Ferrell, 2008), these results
also support the hypothesis that the experience of
regret is associated with adaptive decision making,
independent of the anticipation of regret.
Experiment 2b
Experiment 2b was identical to 2a, but we also con-
trolled for children’s verbal ability.
Method
Participants
One hundred and seventeen 6- to 7-year-olds (62
females, 55 males, M = 82.4 months, range = 72–
95 months) participated.
Apparatus
The materials used were the same as the ﬁrst
two experiments. Each participant completed the
British Picture Vocabulary Scale II (BPVS II; Dunn,
Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997), which is a stan-
dardized measure of receptive vocabulary.
Table 4
Numbers of Children Showing Each Pattern of Choices on Day 2 in Experiments 2a and 2b Broken Down by Whether Participants Experienced
Regret in the Regret Condition
Experience regret
Baseline condition Regret condition Adaptive switching
Switch No switch Switch No switch Yes No
Experiment 2a
Yes (N = 38) 11 27 37 1 26 12
No (N = 32) 17 15 18 14 10 22
Experiment 2b
Yes (N = 61) 19 42 53 8 38 23
No (N = 52) 21 31 36 16 18 34
Note. The two leftmost data columns show the numbers of children switching choices in the baseline condition. The middle data col-
umns show equivalent numbers for the regret condition. The rightmost data columns show the numbers of children who switched
adaptively (i.e., switched in the regret but not baseline condition).
Table 5
Results of the Binary Logistic Regression Analyses on Adaptive Choice
Switching From Experiments 2a and 2b
95% CI for Exp b
B (SE) Lower Exp b Upper
Experiment 2a
Regret on Day 1 1.60* (0.52) 1.78 4.96 13.87
Age in months 0.03 (0.04) 0.96 1.03 1.12
Constant 3.33 (3.25) 0.04
Experiment 2b
Regret on Day 1 1.12* (0.42) 1.36 3.08 6.96
Age in months 0.02 (0.03) 0.92 0.98 1.04
Raw BPVS scores 0.01 (0.02) 0.98 1.01 1.04
Constant 0.59 (2.47) 1.8
Note. For Experiment 2a, R2 = .12 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .14
(Cox & Snell), .19 (Nagelkerke); model v2(2) = 10.48, p < .006.
For Experiment 2b, R2 = .12 (Hosmer & Lemeshow), .14 (Cox &
Snell), .19 (Nagelkerke); model v2(2) = 10.48, p < .006.
BPVS = British Picture Vocabulary Scale.
*p < .003.
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Procedure
At the start of the testing session on Day 1 the
BPVS was administered to each participant; the
remaining procedures for Day 1 and Day 2 were
identical to those used Experiments 1 and 2a.
Results and Discussion
Table 2 shows the Day 1 responses for regret
and baseline conditions; as in Experiment 2a, the
majority of children reported feeling sadder in the
regret condition but the same in the baseline
condition. The data from four children who
reported feeling sadder after the counterfactual
prize revealed in both conditions were excluded
from analyses. For the remaining 113 participants,
rates of choice switching on Day 2 in each condi-
tion, and rates of adaptive choice switching, both
broken down by whether participants experienced
regret, are presented in Table 4. More participants
experienced regret on Day 1 than did not experi-
ence regret, but, as was the case in Experiments 1
and 2a, the experience of regret appears to be asso-
ciated with adaptive choice switching on Day 2. A
chi-square test showed this association between
regret on Day 1 and choice switching on Day 2 to
be signiﬁcant, v2(1, N = 113) = 8.60, p < .005,
ΦC = .28. In this experiment, the association
between experienced regret and switching in the
regret condition was statistically signiﬁcant, v2(1,
N = 113) = 5.23, p < .03, ΦC = .22, but the associa-
tion between experienced regret and switching in
the baseline condition was not, v2(1) = 1.05, p > .1.
Thus, the ability to experience regret is associated
with adaptive choice switching whether or not one
controls for a general tendency to switch.
Participants’ mean standardized score on the
BPVS was 100.43 (SD = 10.86). We carried out a
binary logistic regression with adaptive choice
switching on Day 2 as the outcome variable and
raw BPVS scores, age in months, and whether
regret was experienced on Day 1 as predictor vari-
ables. The results of this analysis are presented in
Table 5 where it may be seen that regret on Day 1
was the only signiﬁcant predictor of adaptive
choice switching on Day 2. Because the BPVS is
often used as a proxy for general intelligence, our
ﬁnding that adaptive switching on Day 2 is not
associated with BPVS scores could be understood
as suggesting that the relation between the ability
to experience regret and adaptive decision making
is a direct one, and is not driven by effects of intel-
ligence measured separately from age.
Experiment 3
Thus far our results show that the ability to experi-
ence regret is associated with adaptive choice
switching. However, there are a number of reasons
why such an association may hold. There may be a
direct relation between the ability to experience
regret and adaptive decision making or the relation
may be more indirect (e.g., as a result of a separate
mediating variable). That the association holds
when BPVS scores and age are separately con-
trolled for is evidence for a direct rather than indi-
rect relation. However, so far we have not provided
any evidence regarding the processes that might
underpin such a direct relation. One possible pro-
cess is memory: An inability to experience regret
might be associated with poorer recall of Day 1 out-
comes, which may lead to poor decision making on
Day 2. It may be that experiencing regret facilitates
memory for the actual contents of the boxes, in line
with suggestions that emotion has an impact on
memory accuracy (e.g., Bradley, Greenwald, Petry,
& Lang, 1992; Christianson & Loftus, 1987;
McGaugh, 2002), and that remembering the con-
tents accurately is necessary for adaptive choice
switching in this task. Indeed, as Baumeister et al.
(2007) discuss, one of the means by which emotions
might affect learning is by facilitating memory for
aspects of the situation that resulted in the emotion.
To examine this possibility, in Experiment 3 we
asked all participants, before they made their
choice on Day 2, to recall the contents of each box.
A number of results were possible. If memory dif-
ferences underlie the association observed in Exper-
iments 1–2b, then we would expect participants
who did not experience regret to have poorer mem-
ory for the contents of the boxes on Day 2 than
participants who did experience regret. Alterna-
tively, all participants may have equally good
memory for the box contents when asked explicitly,
but perhaps those who experienced regret in our
previous experiments were more likely to spontane-
ously bring those memories to bear on the task on
Day 2. If this is correct, all participants may do
equally well when probed with memory questions,
and because of those questions, they may do
equally well on the decision-making task in the
regret condition. A third possibility is that partici-
pants will not be able to answer the explicit mem-
ory questions, but nevertheless, as in previous
experiments, regretters will show adaptive choice
switching on Day 2. This possibility is interesting,
because it would suggest that regret can serve like
a reinforcement process, marking a choice as a bad
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choice, without requiring recollection of why this is
the case.
In addition to introducing memory questions,
we included a further task to assess children’s
counterfactual thinking taken from Amsel et al.’s
(2014) study, which we labeled the alternative out-
come task. This task was similar to our regret task,
in that children made a choice between two con-
tainers and then received a prize. Children were
then shown the counterfactual prize and were
asked to rate how they would feel if they had
received it. The critical difference between the alter-
native outcome task and the regret task is that in
the latter, children must report on how they feel
about their actual choice, whereas in the alternative
outcome task, children need only consider how
they would feel if they had received a different
prize. Amsel et al. found that children were able to
report how they would feel if they had received a
better prize at an earlier age (4–5 years) than they
showed evidence of regret (6 years). As Amsel
et al. point out, the experience of regret has two
cognitive components. First, it involves the ability
to think counterfactually about alternative states of
affairs and the emotional consequences of those
alternatives. Second, it involves bringing to bear
knowledge about those alternatives and their emo-
tional consequences to assessments about the actual
outcome that a choice has resulted in. The alterna-
tive outcomes task assesses the ﬁrst of these abili-
ties, whereas only the regret task assesses the
second one. If children who fail to show regret in
the regret condition also fail in this task, it would
suggest that they not just fail to experience regret
about their choices but they have more global
problems reasoning about counterfactual scenarios.
Such problems in counterfactual thinking rather
than in experiencing regret per se may lie behind
the group differences we have found.
Method
Participants
Sixty 6- and 7-year-olds (29 females, M = 78.8
months, range = 72–90 months) participated.
Apparatus and Procedure
With the exception of two changes on Day 2, the
basic apparatus and procedure were identical to
those used in Experiments 1–2b. The ﬁrst change
on Day 2 involved the inclusion of memory ques-
tions. At the start of each condition on Day 2,
before the participant chose a colored box, the
researcher pointed to one box and asked the child,
“Do you remember how many tokens are in this
box?” Once the child responded the researcher
pointed to the other box and asked the recall ques-
tion again. The presentation of boxes in each condi-
tion was counterbalanced and children received no
feedback on their responses. The second change
was that an additional counterfactual understand-
ing assessment—the alternative outcome task—was
introduced at the end of the decision-making task.
In this task, two identical bags containing either
one or six coloring pencils were used. The partici-
pant was asked to choose one bag for a prize and
to rate how they felt about their prize on the
5-point affective scale. The participant was then
shown the prize from the unchosen bag and was
asked, “How would you have felt if you had cho-
sen this bag instead?” Participants indicated their
response in the same manner as they had in the
main part of the experiment. Outcomes on this task
were not rigged, with the result that some of the
children had to make a judgment about how they
would feel if they had received the better prize of
six pencils (N = 35), and some had to judge how
they would feel if they had received the worse
prize of one pencil (N = 25).
Results and Discussion
The majority of participants (87%, N = 52) an-
swered the counterfactual question correctly in the
alternative outcome task, indicating that they
would have felt happier if they had won six color-
ing pencils and sadder if they had won one color-
ing pencil. Four of the eight children who did not
give the appropriate response experienced regret
and four did not. These results suggest that chil-
dren who failed to experience regret nevertheless
have the basic ability to reason about the emotional
consequences of counterfactual scenarios.
The responses given by participants to the Day 2
memory questions are shown in Table 6. In the
regret condition we coded as correct answers giving
the precise number of tokens in each box or indicat-
ing that there were “more” or “lots of” tokens in
the nonchosen box. Only one participant answered
the memory question incorrectly in the regret con-
dition. In the baseline condition, eight participants
answered the memory question incorrectly by indi-
cating that there had been one token in the box
they chose and two tokens in the other box, or that
there had been two tokens in each box. Of these
nine participants who gave an incorrect answer, six
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experienced regret on Day 1 and three did not.
Thus, regardless of whether or not participants
experienced regret on Day 1, they were able to
remember the contents of the boxes when explicitly
asked to do so. The analyses that follows includes
all 60 children; however excluding children who
incorrectly answered either a memory question or
the test question in the alternative outcome task did
not alter the results.
Table 3 shows that on Day 1, as in Experiments
2a and 2b, the majority of children felt sadder in
the regret condition but the same in the baseline
condition after the counterfactual prize was
revealed. On Day 2, almost all participants (35 of
36 regretters and 21 of 24 nonregretters) switched
boxes in the regret condition. These results are
strikingly different to earlier results in that the vast
majority of participants in this experiment
switched in the regret condition regardless of
whether they had experienced regret on Day 1. As
a result, unlike the ﬁndings from Experiments 2a
and 2b, there was no association found between
the experience of regret on Day 1 and switching in
the regret condition, Fisher exact probability = .29.
However, as was the case in Experiment 2a, a sig-
niﬁcant association was found between the experi-
ence of regret and switching in the baseline
condition, v2(1, N = 60) = 7.14, p < .01 ΦC = .35,
such that participants who did not experience
regret were more likely to switch than those who
experienced regret. This was because only 10 of 36
regretters switched in the baseline condition, but
15 of 24 nonregretters did so.
The results of this experiment rule out memory
differences as a potential cause of the association
between the experience of regret and adaptive
choice switching: Children had very good memory
for box contents and their memory was equally
good regardless of whether they experienced regret
on Day 1. Likewise, the results rule out more basic
differences in the ability to think counterfactually as
a cause of the association; even 6- to 7-year-olds
who fail to experience regret were able to answer a
simpler question about the emotional consequences
of a counterfactual scenario.
Although this experiment does not establish
exactly how the experience of regret has an impact
on decision making, we can speculate on this pro-
cess on the basis of its ﬁndings. Once participants
answered the memory question, they overwhelm-
ingly switched adaptively in the regret condition,
regardless of whether they had experienced regret
on Day 1. This ﬁnding suggests that the experience
of regret has its effects via its consequences for
whether participants spontaneously bring their
memory of the original choice outcomes to bear on
Day 2. Children who experience regret will have
made an evaluative comparison about the counter-
factual outcome on Day 1 relative to the actual out-
come, and thus, when faced with the same
situation, seem to spontaneously bring to mind the
relative values of different outcomes, which then
inform their decision to switch adaptively. By con-
trast, children who do not experience regret seem
to need to be explicitly asked to bring to mind the
relative values of the outcomes.
Although for the sake of brevity we have not
reported the ﬁndings previously, we asked partici-
pants in Experiments 1–3 to explain their choices
on Day 2 when they decided to switch. We intro-
duce these ﬁndings now because they are relevant
to the interpretation of the data from Experiment 3.
We coded these explanations (see Table 7) as the
desire to swap (corresponding to something like a
novelty preference), the need to choose adaptively
(typically involving reference to one of the boxes
having the better prize), or to some other unrelated
factor (e.g., a preference for one of the pictures on a
box). An examination of Table 7 reveals that in the
regret condition the majority of explanations given
by participants who experienced regret in Experi-
ments 1–2b involved adaptive switching. On the
other hand, this was only true of participants who
did not experience regret when they were asked the
memory question in Experiment 3. These explana-
tions provide further evidence that participants
who experienced regret explicitly and spontane-
ously recalled Day 1 decision outcomes when mak-
ing their choice on Day 2, whereas those who did
Table 6
Performance on the Memory Questions in Experiment 3, Broken Down
by Whether Children Were Classiﬁed as Having Experienced Regret on
Day 1
Experience
regret
Baseline condition Regret condition
1 + 1
token
1 + 2
tokens
2 + 2
tokens
1 + 10
tokens
“Lots”/
“More”
tokens
1 + 1
tokens
Yes
(N = 36)
31 3 2 31 4 1
No
(N = 24)
21 3 0 19 5 0
Note. “1 + 2” and “2 + 2” responses in the baseline condition
and “1 + 1” responses in the regret condition are inaccurate.
“Lots”/“More” responses in the regret condition indicate that
children could remember that there were more tokens in the
nonchosen box but not the exact number of tokens.
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not experience regret did not do so unless
prompted.
Although we found that regretters and nonre-
gretters behaved similarly in the regret condition
on Day 2, these groups differed in the likelihood
that they would switch in the baseline condition (a
nonadaptive switch; this group difference on base-
line condition was also found in Experiment 2a but
not in Experiment 2b). This result is puzzling
because in Experiment 3 both groups of children
successfully recalled that there was one token in
each box before making their Day 2 choice, yet the
nonregretters were more likely switch boxes.
Inspection of Table 7 shows that around half of the
nonregretters who switched in the baseline condi-
tion in Experiment 3 explained their decision in
terms of simply wanting a different box, and they
differ from the regretters in this respect. It may be
that there are some children who are prepared to
opt for a slightly worse outcome (one token rather
than two tokens) to satisfy their novelty preference;
why these children are more likely to be those who
did not experience regret is unclear. Alternatively,
it could be that these children did not properly
evaluate the difference between their choices and
did not realize that they would be opting for a
worse outcome, even though the mathematics
involved was very simple. Arguably, this latter sug-
gestion ﬁts better with the ﬁnding that these chil-
dren were more likely to have been from the
nonregretter group—children who did not seem to
spontaneously evaluate the difference between bet-
ter and worse outcomes on Day 1.
General Discussion
This study is the ﬁrst to simultaneously examine
regret and decision making in young children. The
results of Experiment 1 show that the ability to
switch a decision adaptively given a previous rela-
tively bad outcome emerges at the same time in
development as the ability to experience regret. The
results of Experiment 2a show a strong association
between the ability to experience regret and adap-
tive choice switching when controlling for age, and
those from Experiment 2b show the same associa-
tion when also controlling for verbal ability. We
interpret these results as suggesting that the experi-
ence of regret itself may facilitate this form of adap-
tive choice switching in children.
The ﬁndings of Experiment 3 allow us to specu-
late about the processes that might underpin the
facilitative effect of regret in our task. When explic-
itly asked to recall the contents of the boxes from
Day 1, even children who had not experienced
regret were very accurate at remembering what the
boxes contained. Moreover, they were then able to
adaptively switch their choices in the regret condi-
tion and to justify this decision with reference to
the difference in contents between the boxes. This
contrasted with the performance of this group of
children in the previous experiments, in which they
were likely to fail to switch choices in the regret
condition and even when they did switch often jus-
tiﬁed their choice in terms of nonadaptive reasons.
These ﬁndings suggest that all children were highly
aware on Day 1 of the prize in the nonchosen box.
However, those who experienced regret were much
more likely to bring this information to bear when
faced with the same choice on Day 2 (Experiments
1–2b). Thus, in our task, previously experienced
regret seems to predispose decision makers toward
explicit recall of the outcomes associated with par-
ticular decisions when those options are reencoun-
tered.
Further studies are necessary to establish
whether this is the correct interpretation of our
Table 7
The Number of Children Giving Each Type of Explanation for Chang-
ing Box Choice on Day 2 in Experiments 1–3, Broken Down by
Whether Participants Experienced Regret on Day 1
Experience
regret
Baseline condition Regret condition
Desire
to
swap Unrelated
Desire
to
swap
Adaptive
switching Unrelated
Experiment 1
Yes
(N = 48)
8 5 7 30 7
No
(N = 30)
5 13 3 6 10
Experiment 2a
Yes
(N = 38)
6 5 5 28 4
No
(N = 32)
11 6 3 10 5
Experiment 2b
Yes
(N = 61)
8 11 4 36 13
No
(N = 52)
4 17 5 14 17
Experiment 3
Yes
(N = 36)
3 7 1 30 4
No
(N = 24)
8 7 3 15 3
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ﬁndings, and, if so, to what extent such a mecha-
nism might generalize to other tasks. We note,
though, that this explanation of our ﬁndings sug-
gests a simple way in which experienced regret
might impact on decision making without the
involvement of anticipatory regret. The general
issue of whether it is the experience of or the antici-
pation of an emotion that primarily has behavioral
consequences is a matter of considerable debate
(e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007; Loewenstein, Weber,
Hsee, & Welch, 2001). As noted in the Introduction,
formal models of regret and decision making have
focused on how anticipated regret might impact on
people’s choices and the vast majority of empirical
studies with adults examining the effects of regret
on decision making have studied the behavioral
consequences of anticipated rather than experienced
regret (e.g., Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999; Si-
monson, 1992; Zeelenberg et al., 1996). Our results
suggest that the experience of regret is associated
with adaptive decision making in children who are
several years younger than the age by which the
ability to anticipate regret is thought to develop
(Amsel et al., 2005; Guttentag & Ferrell, 2008). It
may be that once anticipatory regret emerges there
are additional, and perhaps more widespread,
effects on children’s decision making; we see this as
an important direction for future research (see also
Amsel et al., 2005). However, the current results
suggest that there is a means by which experienced
regret per se can affect behavior, indicating that the
emergence of regret may have important develop-
mental consequences.
We have broadly characterized our ﬁndings as
indicating that once children are capable of experi-
encing regret, they engage in better decision mak-
ing. However, what we have found is an
association in a speciﬁc context between whether or
not children report regret and the quality of their
subsequent decision making. Framed as a develop-
mental claim, our interpretation of the ﬁndings
assumes that children who do not report regret in
our task are not yet capable of doing so. It remains
possible that children we characterized as “nonre-
gretters” may be capable of experiencing regret
under different circumstances (e.g., if the counter-
factual alternative were particularly attractive), and
it is important in future research to widen the scope
of paradigms used to assess regret in children. We
doubt, though, that the failure of young children to
demonstrate regret is merely task dependent.
Rather, there are cognitive prerequisites that are
required for experiencing regret that some children
may not yet have developed. A basic role for cogni-
tion is clear if we consider that experiencing regret
is only possible if children are able to think counter-
factually. However, there appears to be a develop-
mental lag between the emergence of counterfactual
thinking and the ability to experience regret (Amsel
& Smalley, 2000; Amsel et al., 2014; Beck, Riggs, &
Burns, 2011; Perner & Rafetseder, 2011). This sug-
gests that the ability to think counterfactually is
necessary but not sufﬁcient for the experience of
regret. The ﬁndings of Experiment 3 also support
this suggestion: Children who did not show evi-
dence of regret were nevertheless able to reason
that they would have felt happier if they had been
given a better prize (the alternative outcome task).
Beck et al. (2011) have argued that regret involves
more complex cognitive processes than are typically
tapped in tasks assessing children’s counterfactual
reasoning. In at least some counterfactual reasoning
tasks, children are required to hold two possible
worlds in mind: the actual world and the counter-
factual world (Beck, Robinson, Carroll, & Apperly,
2006; see Perner & Rafetseder, 2011, for discussion).
Beck et al. (2011) argue that experiencing regret
involves making spontaneous evaluative compari-
sons between these worlds, and that this requires
being able to ﬂexibly switch between representa-
tions. Some initial evidence for this suggestion
comes from Burns et al.’s (2012) study, which
found that a measure of task switching from an
executive function battery was a signiﬁcant predic-
tor of regret on a task similar to our boxes task.
Burns et al. (2012) measured task switching
using a typical set-switching task in which partici-
pants had to ﬂexibly change which rule they used
to guide a button-press. Whether children experi-
enced regret on the boxes task was selectively
related to their performance on trials in which they
had to switch rule (in contrast to nonswitch trials).
In our study, we were also interested in children’s
switching behavior, but in a very different sense:
We were interested in what we have termed adap-
tive choice switching. That is, we were interested in
whether children would appropriately change their
choice when faced with the same choice again on a
second day. Although adaptive choice switching is
very different to the sort of task switching mea-
sured by Burns et al., putting our ﬁndings together
with theirs points to an important way in which
the development of emotional and cognitive control
processes may mutually interact to lead to age-
related changes in decision making. Burns et al.’s
ﬁndings suggest that a sufﬁcient degree of cognitive
ﬂexibility is necessary in order to spontaneously
compare and evaluate actual and counterfactual
Experienced Regret and Decision Making 2007
outcomes and thus experience regret; our ﬁndings
suggest that once children are capable of experienc-
ing regret, this emotional development in turn then
allows them to change their behavior adaptively. In
other words, although cognitive ﬂexibility may be
(at least) part of what is necessary developmentally
for experiencing regret, once this emotional ability
is intact it feeds into decision-making processes to
allow children to adapt and change their behavior
appropriately.
If this suggestion is correct, it suggests a quite
speciﬁc route by which changes in cognitive ﬂexi-
bility can lead to more adaptive and ﬂexible behav-
ior: by supporting the developmental emergence of
regret. It is widely accepted that the development
of executive processes will have an impact on chil-
dren’s behavior (e.g., Diamond & Lee, 2011; Mu-
nakata, Synder, & Chatham, 2012; Stuss, 1992), but
the general idea is typically that improvements in
these cognitive processes directly impact on chil-
dren’s ability to regulate their behavior appropri-
ately. Here, we are suggesting that they may also
do so indirectly: by underpinning the emergence of
the functional emotion of regret, which itself then
serves to help children adjust their behavior in
adaptive ways. This suggestion ﬁts with the general
thrust of Baumeister et al.’s (2007) claim that emo-
tions such as regret should be seen as the input to a
ﬂexible feedback system that plays a key role
behavioral regulation.
It also coheres well with accounts of regret and
decision making that have emerged from the neuro-
psychological literature. Indeed, the functioning of
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) has been described in
exactly these sorts of terms, i.e., as integrating cog-
nitive and emotional processes in this way to guide
decision making (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli
et al., 2005), and OFC is known to mature over a
protracted developmental period (see Happaney,
Zelazo, & Stuss, 2004, for review). Coricelli et al.
(2005) argue that the experience of regret results in
a change in the emotional values associated with
choices, biasing against choices that led to a regret-
table outcome and triggering an assessment of how
behavior needs to change. They argue that the OFC
is involved in the evaluative comparison between
both actual and counterfactual outcomes, which
they view as recruiting declarative cognitive pro-
cesses, and also in appropriately modifying behav-
ior based on the outcome of this comparison.
Our ﬁndings provide new evidence of a role for
emotional alongside cognitive development in the
development of decision making, and suggest a
way to begin to ﬁll the gap identiﬁed by others
concerning the part played by affective processes in
children’s decision making (Jacobs & Klaczynski,
2002; Schlottmann & Wilkening, 2011). Much recent
research on adult and adolescent decision making
has emphasized the role of emotional processes, in
part because cognitive measures are not necessarily
good predictors of optimal decision making (To-
plak, Sorge, Benoit, West, & Stanovich, 2010), and
in part because developmental differences between
adult and adolescent decision making seem to vary
depending on the emotional signiﬁcance of the task
(Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009; van
Duijvenvoorde, Jansen, Visser, & Huizenga, 2010).
Our ﬁndings suggest a quite speciﬁc way in which
emotional processes may be important earlier in
development: that once children become capable of
experiencing regret, their decision making may also
improve. This emphasis on regret provides a novel
way of thinking about why some young children
may be better decision makers than others, or why
certain types of decision making may change as
children get older.
In summary, we have demonstrated a strong
association between experienced regret and adap-
tive choice switching, and initial evidence that
experienced regret can inﬂuence decision making
independently of the ability to anticipate regret.
The exact mechanisms involved are not yet clear,
but we have suggested that previously experienced
regret may cause decision makers to spontaneously
recall the outcomes associated with decision
options, thus making them more likely to choose
differently when they are faced with the same deci-
sion again. We hope that ours are the ﬁrst of many
experiments to investigate the relation between the
experience of regret and subsequent decision mak-
ing in young children. Putting our ﬁndings together
with those from other developmental studies (Gut-
tentag & Ferrell, 2008; O’Connor et al., 2012; Weis-
berg & Beck, 2010), a distinct developmental
picture of regret is beginning to emerge that has
implications for future studies of regret and choice
in both children and adults. One important devel-
opmental question is whether individual differences
in children’s ability to experience or anticipate
regret are associated with the quality of their deci-
sion making more generally. There is much concern
about decision quality in children and adolescents
(for a review, see Boyer, 2006) and perhaps examin-
ing the role of regret will provide a way to predict,
and potentially improve, decision quality in young
decision makers.
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